During June 23--July 5, 2000, an outbreak of respiratory illnesses occurred on
the MS Rotterdam (Holland America Line & Windstar Cruises) during a 12-day
Baltic cruise from the United Kingdom to Germany via Russia. The ship carried
1311 passengers, primarily from the United States, and 506 crew members from
many countries. Although results of rapid viral testing for influenza A and B viruses
were negative, immunofluorescence staining and viral culture results implicated influenza
B virus infection as the cause of the outbreak. This report summarizes the findings of
the outbreak investigation conducted by the ship's medical department and describes
the measures taken to control the outbreak. Travelers at high risk for complications
of influenza who were not vaccinated with influenza vaccine during the preceding fall
or winter should consider receiving influenza vaccine before travel with large
tourist groups at any time of year or to certain regions of the world.
On June 26, nine crew members presented to the ship's infirmary with cough,
sore throat, and fever >100.0 F
(>37.8 C ). All had developed symptoms during
the preceding 24 hours. Oropharyngeal specimens from two crew members were
tested by a commercial rapid influenza diagnostic test designed to detect both influenza A
and B viruses but not to distinguish between them. Although test results were
negative, three crew members with high fevers were started on rimantadine therapy
for clinically suspected influenza A infection.
To characterize and control the suspected outbreak among crew members,
ship's medical staff implemented a respiratory illness protocol that included surveillance
for cases of respiratory illness. A case of acute respiratory illness (ARI) was defined
as cough or sore throat. Influenza-like illness (ILI), a subset of ARI cases, was defined
as ARI with fever >100.0 F (>37.8 C) or self-reported feverishness. Active
surveillance was initiated among crew members. Supervisors on each work shift observed
and asked crew members about symptoms of influenza and required any crew
member with symptoms to report to the ship's infirmary for evaluation. Crew members
with confirmed ILI were relieved of duty and placed in cabin isolation either alone or
with other ill crew members. Passive surveillance was initiated among passengers
and identified any passenger who presented to the ship's infirmary with respiratory
illness. A commercial rapid influenza diagnostic test, designed to detect both influenza A and
B viruses but not to distinguish between them, was used selectively to assist
in diagnosis. Medical and demographic information, including country of residence,
cabin number, and crew duties (if applicable), was collected from ill patients.
By June 29, 38 crew members and 26 passengers had been seen in the
infirmary for ARI; of these, 32 (84%) crew members and 11 (42%) passengers had ILI. Eight
crew members were tested by rapid influenza diagnostic testing; all had negative
results. Because the etiology of crew respiratory illnesses remained uncertain,
four symptomatic crew members disembarked in Stockholm, Sweden, for
medical evaluation that included testing of nasopharyngeal specimens by
immunofluorescence staining and viral culture. Two of four nasopharyngeal specimens tested positive
for influenza B virus by immunofluorescence staining; one of the two specimens also
was positive by culture. Neither of the two crew members diagnosed with influenza B
virus infection had been tested using the rapid influenza diagnostic test. On the basis
immunofluorescence results, crew members on rimantadine therapy, which
is effective only against influenza A infection, were advised to discontinue
their medication. Oseltamivir, an antiviral agent that is effective against both influenza
A and B infection, was sent to the ship for treatment of ill crew members
A total of 64 (13%) crew members and 54 (4%) passengers were identified
with ARI during the cruise. Of 63 crew members and 54 passengers with ARI for
whom clinical information was known, 45 (71%) and 25 (46%), respectively, also had
ILI. The median age of ill crew members was 32 years (range: 21--56
years) and of passengers, 68 years (range: 7--85 years). By cross-referencing crew
duties, cabin locations of ill crew members and passengers, and dates of illness, medical
staff identified the potential index case-patient as a 78-year-old U.S. passenger
who boarded the ship ill with unconfirmed ILI after visiting London. She remained in
her cabin except for occasional meals and did not seek medical attention until the fifth
day of the cruise (June 28). Two of the 13 crew members with ILI, who were seen in
the infirmary on June 25 and 26, were her cabin and dining room stewards. Both
had worked, socialized, or shared cabins with other crew members who became
ill. Surveillance among passengers and crew members was continued during
the subsequent cruise and showed a decrease in the number of ARI and ILI cases.
Reported by: SE Christensen, RC Wolfmeyer, SM Suver, CD Hill, MD, Holland America Line
& Windstar Cruises, Seattle, Washington. SFF Britton, MD, Karolinska Institute,
Stockholm, Sweden. Influenza Br, Div of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases; Surveillance and
Epidemiology Br, Div of Quarantine, National Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC.
The findings of this investigation implicated influenza B virus as
the cause of a respiratory illness outbreak onboard a cruise ship. Although the results
of rapid viral testing for influenza A and B viruses were negative, influenza B
infection was confirmed by viral culture and immunofluorescence antibody testing in two
crew members. Although these tests were not performed on passengers,
epidemiologic evidence suggested that respiratory illness cases among crew members
and passengers were related and that an ill passenger might have transmitted infection
to crew members.
Rapid viral diagnostic testing for influenza can be useful for patient
management and influenza outbreak control. However, these tests are not as accurate in
detecting influenza infection as viral culture
(1). If an influenza outbreak is suspected, nasopharyngeal specimens should be collected simultaneously for rapid viral tests
and viral isolation. Viral isolation is essential for identifying new or unusual strains
of influenza and for selecting influenza vaccine strains.
Influenza A outbreaks have been reported on cruise ships sailing in the
Northern Hemisphere during the summer, but influenza B outbreaks have not been
documented (2--7). Early suspicion of a potential influenza outbreak among crew members
and rapid implementation of a respiratory illness control protocol probably limited the
size of the outbreak. Key elements of the protocol included 1) implementation of active
and passive surveillance using standard case definitions; 2) use of targeted rapid
influenza diagnostic testing and viral cultures to confirm cases of influenza virus infection;
3) isolation of all crew members meeting the ILI case definition or those with
influenza; 4) use of antiviral agents for treatment and, if indicated, for prophylaxis;
and 5) monitoring of intervention results
Because influenza viruses usually are spread by droplets and aerosols produced
by an infected person who is coughing or sneezing, isolation can limit the spread
of infection in semienclosed environments such as cruise ships
(2). Although the number of days crew members with ILI were isolated from noninfected crew members
and passengers was not reported, isolation measures ideally should have covered the
first 5 days of illness, a period based on the duration of influenza virus shedding in
Summertime influenza outbreaks among passengers and crew members on
cruise ships suggest that traveling in large groups can pose a risk for exposure to
influenza viruses, even when the group is traveling in regions where influenza is not in
seasonal circulation. Both passengers and crew members can serve as potential reservoirs
of influenza infection. Travelers at high risk for complications of influenza (e.g.,
persons aged >50 years, immunocompromised persons, and persons with chronic disorders
of the pulmonary or cardiovascular systems) who were not vaccinated with
influenza vaccine during the preceding fall or winter should consider receiving influenza
vaccine before travel 1) with large organized tourist groups at any time of year; 2) to
the tropics; or 3) to the Southern Hemisphere from April through September (the time
of increased influenza activity in that hemisphere)
(9). Cruise lines should attempt to achieve at least an 80% vaccination rate among crew members on each ship
each year (8).
- Anonymous. Rapid diagnostic tests for influenza. Medical Letter 1999;41:121--2.
- Miller JM, Tam TWS, Maloney S, et al. Cruise ships: high-risk passengers and the
global spread of new influenza viruses. Clin Infect Dis 2000;31:433--8.
- CDC. Outbreak of influenza A infection---Alaska and the Yukon Territory, June--July
1998. MMWR 1998;47:638.
- CDC. Update: outbreak of influenza A infection---Alaska and the Yukon Territory,
July-- August 1998. MMWR 1998;47:685--8.
- Zane S, Uyeki T, Bodnar U, et al. Influenza in travelers, tourism workers, and residents
in Alaska and the Yukon Territory, summer 1998 [Poster]. Presented at the 6th Conference
of the International Society for Travel Medicine, Montreal, Canada, June 6--10, 1999.
- CDC. Outbreak of influenza A infection among travelers---Alaska and the Yukon
Territory, May--June 1999. MMWR 1999;48:545--6.
- Anonymous. Influenza on a cruise ship in the Mediterranean. Commun Dis Rep CDR
- Bodnar UR, Maloney SM, Fielding KL, et al. Preliminary guidelines for the prevention
and control of influenza-like illness among passengers and crew members on cruise ships.
Atlanta, Georgia: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, National Center
for Infectious Diseases, 1999.
- CDC. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR 2000;49(no. RR-3).